Economic geopolitics and global value chains: the 2026 fault lines
Trade via global value chains reached historical highs in 2024, while tariffs, export controls and chokepoint disruptions coincide with a decline in trade between geopolitical blocs. The measured facts as of 12 November 2026.
Trade via global value chains (GVCs) reached historical highs in 2024, and their share in global GDP remained stable between 2022 and 2024 in real terms, according to the OECD Trends in Global Value Chains, July 2026. Over the same period, tariffs, export restrictions on critical raw materials and the disruption of maritime chokepoints have been documented by several institutions. This analysis, written on 12 November 2026, sets out what the measurements show and where they diverge.
The facts
- GVCs remain central to the world economy: the WTO Global Value Chains Report 2025 states that they have endured the 2008-09 financial crisis, COVID-19 and later geopolitical and climate disruptions.
- The OECD reports that the GVC share of global GDP in 2022-2024 was somewhat higher than in 2008, prior to the Global Financial Crisis.
- According to a European Central Bank paper, trade intensity among geopolitically aligned countries has remained relatively stable, while trade between different geopolitical blocs has declined.
- A Bank of Finland paper states that available empirical evidence points to only marginal changes in international trading patterns so far.
- The World Economic Forum Global Value Chains Outlook 2026 describes a shift from "produce anywhere, deliver everywhere" towards regional systems balancing resilience and efficiency.
Trade follows geopolitical proximity
The ECB reports that doubling the geopolitical distance between two countries is associated with an approximately 20% reduction in bilateral trade. Since 2017, trade between geopolitical rivals was about 4% lower than otherwise expected, while trade between geopolitical partners was approximately 6% higher. The same source notes that reciprocal tariffs since 2018 have affected nearly two-thirds of trade between the United States and China.
The WEF identifies semi-autonomous trade blocs centred on the United States, China, the European Union and emerging "swing states".
The selective character of the split is described by LGT (19 May 2026): the United States and China remain intertwined in trade, finance and technology, while separation is concentrated in advanced semiconductors, rare-earth processing, AI compute, biotechnology and orbital infrastructure.
Critical raw materials and export controls
The OECD Inventory of Export Restrictions on Critical Raw Materials 2026 (April 2026) finds that export restrictions on critical raw materials have risen sharply since 2009. Between 2022 and 2024, a larger share of global trade in raw materials was subject to at least one such measure than in 2009-2011, per the OECD. By mineral, the OECD finds that restrictions cover a large share of global exports of cobalt, manganese, natural graphite and rare-earth elements, according to the OECD. The growth rate of new restrictions slowed markedly between 2023 and 2024, according to the OECD.
On China's rare-earth controls, Tom's Hardware reports that in April 2025 China placed seven medium and heavy rare earths and the magnets made from them under case-by-case licensing. It also reports that the 9 October 2025 expansion was later suspended until 10 November 2026, and that China accounts for roughly 70% of global rare-earth mining, citing USGS data. The same outlet reports that TSMC has sought chipmaking equipment without Chinese rare-earth magnets. The status of the controls after the 10 November 2026 date is not established in the sources reviewed. The IMF (June 2026) links dependence on critical commodities to geopolitical tension because these inputs matter to defence, the energy transition and digital technologies, including AI.
Chokepoints, shipping and trade volumes
Coordinated U.S. and Israeli strikes on Iran on 28 February 2026 were followed by a sharp fall in commercial transit through the Strait of Hormuz, according to Roland Berger. The same source estimates that $191.5 billion of global trade is at risk annually from chokepoint disruption, with three passages accounting for 77% of actual economic losses. A WTO Secretariat estimate puts the volume of world crude oil imports from the Middle East down roughly 45% year-on-year in March.
The WTO has revised its merchandise trade outlook twice in 2026. Its March edition projected growth slowing to 1.9% in 2026 from 4.6% in 2025, and 1.4% under a high-energy-price scenario. Its October edition now expects 3.9% in 2026 and 4.1% in 2027. The same release reports that demand for AI-enabling goods such as semiconductors and servers accounted for 47% of global merchandise trade growth in the first half of 2026, with trade in these products up 67% year-on-year. A secondary source, Third World Network, cites a 2025 outturn of 4.2%, against the WTO's own 4.6%; the sources reviewed do not reconcile the difference.
Investment and corporate footprints
The ECB shows that Western companies have increased greenfield investment in other Western countries while reducing investment in geopolitically distant eastern countries, with intra-Western flows rising since 2016. UNCTAD's World Investment Report 2025 reports that trade fragmentation encourages firms to invest in geopolitically aligned countries.
FDI figures for 2025 differ by vintage.
A 2026 Springer study reports that companies in some sectors are vertically reintegrating, and concludes that value chains will change shape rather than disappear.
European exposure
Eurostat data for 2024 show China as the EU's largest external supplier of goods and the United States as the largest external destination for EU goods exports. Intermediate goods made up a large share of both EU goods exports and imports in 2024, per Eurostat. The European Commission identifies supply-chain resilience, critical-infrastructure security, technology leakage and economic coercion as economic-security risks. An EU analysis warns that reshoring and expanded extraction can raise environmental pressure, strain public budgets and affect jobs in export-oriented sectors.
What is not known yet
- The status of China's suspended October 2025 rare-earth controls after 10 November 2026 is not confirmed in the sources reviewed.
- The extent of the decline in cross-bloc trade is measured differently: the Bank of Finland reports only marginal changes so far, while the ECB documents a decline between blocs.
- The duration of the Hormuz disruption and its lasting effect on trade routes are not available in the sources.
- The two UNCTAD vintages for 2025 FDI, the January 2026 Trends Monitor and the World Investment Report 2026, show different growth rates and are not reconciled in the sources reviewed.
Timeline
| Date | Event | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Since 2018 | Reciprocal U.S.-China tariffs affect nearly two-thirds of bilateral trade | ECB |
| February 2022 | Russia's invasion of Ukraine triggers an energy crisis | ECB |
| April 2025 | China licenses exports of seven medium and heavy rare earths and magnets | Tom's Hardware |
| 28 February 2026 | Strikes on Iran; Hormuz transit falls below ten vessels per day | Roland Berger |
| 8 October 2026 | WTO raises 2026 merchandise trade growth forecast to 3.9% | WTO |
| 10 November 2026 | Suspension of China's expanded rare-earth controls runs to this date | Tom's Hardware |
Evidence
| Mineral | Share of global exports subject to restrictions | Period | Source |
|---|
| Trade measure | Value | Date | Source |
|---|
| Fact | Source | Date |
|---|---|---|
| Merchandise trade volume forecast at 3.9% for 2026, up from 1.9% in March | WTO | 8 October 2026 |
| AI-enabling goods 47% of merchandise trade growth, first half of 2026 | WTO | 8 October 2026 |
| Middle East crude imports down roughly 45% year-on-year in March | WTO | 31 July 2026 |
— InekIA Editorial Team
Further reading: geopolitical risk monitoring, a five-step method and the software to run it.
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